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Little: Merit Retention Elections

MERIT RETENTION ELECTIONS
Joseph W. Little

∗

Florida Bar Immediate Past President Scott Hawkins’s law review
essay publishes this eye-catching fact: “90% of the participating voters do
not understand what the term ‘judicial merit retention’ means.”1 This
ignorance sends a troubling message because merit retention of appellate
judges has been the law in Florida since 1976 and three supreme court
justices and numerous district court judges are on the November general
election ballot. Even worse, Florida voters themselves chose this method to
hold appellate judges accountable instead of submitting them to periodic
popular elections, which was the rule in Florida for most of its history as a
state.
Much has been written about the controversial history of how judges
are selected and retained in the United States.2 The controversy arises from
a clash between irreconcilable political goals: a desire for judges to make
decisions free of partisan biases, and an urge to hold judges publicly
accountable when decisions stray too far from some measure of political
legitimacy in the public eye. The Florida “merit” system reaches a
somewhat uneasy compromise between these goals. Appellate judges are
screened by nominating commissions, presumably on the merits, and
appointed from a slate by the governor. They are then periodically
“evaluated,” presumably also on the merits, in an election in which the
electors vote “yes” to “retain” for another six years or “no” to end a
judge’s tenure. Hawkins’s essay laments that few voters know anything
about merit retention elections much less about whether to vote yes or no.
This ignorance casts doubt on the system’s theoretical premises.
To date, the Florida merit retention system has equated to life
appointments for appellate judges.3 In thirty-three years, the electors have
voted out no judge or justice in a retention election. In other states,
removal has been exceedingly rare.4 Even then, voters have not usually
ousted incompetent, slothful or corrupt judges, but those who endorsed
decisions offensive to the political beliefs of a major portion of the
electorate. These include judges who steadfastly voted against the death
∗ Professor of Law (Emeritus), University of Florida College of Law.
1. Scott G. Hawkins, Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1422, 1423 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping
Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839 (2012).
3. More accurately, appointment to age seventy. The Florida Constitution disqualifies judges
at age seventy. FLA. CONST. art V, § 8. Also, some justices and judges voluntarily resign. As
examples, Justice Rosemary Barkett accepted an appointment on the federal appeals court; First
District of Appeal Judge Charles Kahn became a federal magistrate; and Justices Raoul Cantero,
Kenneth Bell, and Arthur England, among others, resigned to return to private practice.
4. Albert J. Klumpp, Three Decades of Elections and Candidates, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2008,
at 12.
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penalty,5 voted to invalidate school vouchers for religious schools,6 and
voted to invalidate restrictions on gay marriage.7
Two former Florida supreme justices were unsuccessfully threatened on
similar bases: Justice Leander Shaw for authoring a pro-abortion opinion
and Justice Rosemary Barkett for her perceived “softness” on crime.8 Both
these threats proved flabby and the electors retained them by safe margins.
This year, the three retention candidates are targeted in part for their
rejection of a Florida school voucher law that violated the Florida
guarantee of a “uniform” system of free public schools.9 In sum, the
justices scorned a measure cherished by the legislature, the governor, and
major segments of the populace, and they now face the ire of the scorned
in their bid for merit retention at the polling booths.
While it might have had merit in olden days, popular election of
appellate judges in today’s cash-driven electoral world would be a
democratic travesty. Although merit retention offers a better alternative to
direct election, these elections in Florida are nevertheless a sham. Nothing
in the system itself gives the electors a means to evaluate merit. When the
retention elections routinely retain all candidates, the competent, the
honest, the incompetent, and the corrupt, as they have done, their
supporters may crow that the system promotes both merit and
accountability. But when organized opposition arises against a judge on
political grounds, defenders cry “foul” against mixing up politics with
“merit.” This, they lament, is an assault against judicial independence.
From whence came this notion of judicial immunity to political
scrutiny? In pre-revolutionary England, judges bowed and scraped to the
person of the monarch who appointed them, removed them, and sometimes
did worse things to those who acted contrary to the monarch’s will. One of
the most stirring encounters occurred at Hampton Court where James I
summoned the judges to lay down the law as to who had the last word on
the decision in any case. Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke, timorously
lying prostrate on the floor, instructed James I that “the king ought not to
be under any man, but under God and the law.”10 In contrast to royal
5. The most notable instance is the removal of Chief Justice Rose Bird and others from the
California Supreme Court. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Politicizing Crime and Punishment: Redefining
“Justice” to Fight the “War on Prisoners,” 114 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 409 & n.121 (2012).
6. The Florida Supreme Court justices are targeted in 2012 in part because of the school
voucher decision in Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006), even though that decision does not
rest on church–state grounds.
7. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
8. Jacqueline R. Griffin, Judging the Judges, 21 LITIG. 5, 7. (1995). Justice Shaw’s opinion
appears in In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
9. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392; cf. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“Adequate provision shall be made
by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that
allows students to obtain a high quality education . . . .”).
10. Many writers cite this episode. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 693 & n.1
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domination, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty largely avoided
clashes (and still does) between English judges and the legislature. In
England, with few exceptions, the legitimacy of an act of parliament is not
subject to judicial review.
Hated decisions of royal judges who were answerable to England and
not to the colonials gave great impetus to the American independence
movement. That experience produced American constitutions, both federal
and state, designed to make judges “independent” post-appointment from
the ire of the executive branch. Just as important, Marbury v. Madison—
that most famous of all American judgments—emphatically booted the
notion of parliamentary sovereignty out of the American political
system.11 Congress, said Chief Justice John Marshall, is subservient to the
Constitution and this court has the last word on what the Constitution
means.12 That decision was inflammatory at the time. Marshall wrote it to
offend Thomas Jefferson— and he succeeded. President Jefferson hated
the opinion and despised Marshall. Despite that, from that day to this, any
act of Congress may be upended by what the judges deem to be an
overriding constitutional principle.
The Florida Supreme Court claimed the power to render statutes
unconstitutional in its first clear chance to do so13 and has emphasized its
supervisory authority in these no uncertain terms: “The judiciary is in a
lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the Constitution is the
highest law.”14 The American doctrines of constitutional sovereignty and
judicial interpretive supremacy inevitably create clashes between
legislatures and judges. Call them what you may, judicial resolutions of
these clashes are “political” decisions. The people freely vote to remove
legislators whose decisions they dislike. Who, then, could convince them
that they are not entitled to vote against judges whose “political” decisions
they dislike?
What then are we to do? Until someone devises a better system for
retaining judges, supporters of an assailed judge’s “political” decisions
(E.D. Ark. 1994).
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”).
13. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848).
14. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass’n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972). Alexander Hamilton had referred to the “guardian” role of the courts in The Federalist
Papers. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468–69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(discussing the courts’ “duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution”). The Florida Supreme Court
has also said, “Nevertheless, preference for legislative treatment cannot shackle the courts when
legally protected interests are at stake. As people seek to vindicate their constitutional rights, the
courts have no alternative but to respond. Legislative inaction cannot serve to close the doors of the
courtrooms of this state to its citizens who assert cognizable constitutional rights.” Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360–61 (Fla. 1980).
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must duke out retention elections with those who abhor those decisions.
The judges’ defenders and editorialists may plead for “judicial
independence” as much as they please, but what will count most is the
political strength of the warring partisans for and against the galvanizing
decision. In the vernacular, are you “fur it” or “agin’ it?” While
disappointing to merit retention proponents and a great shame, political
conflict is inherent in the system.
What can the judges do to protect themselves from backlash retention
opposition? One thing they cannot do is replace American
constitutionalism with “legislative sovereignty.” Doing that would be
nothing less than a revolution—treason against the deeply ingrained
culture of Marbury v. Madison. Neither may judges duck constitutional
issues. Nobody benefits from timid judges. Still, judges might occasionally
invoke what used to be called the “political question” doctrine.15 Even
though, according to Tocqueville, every political question in the United
States ultimately becomes a legal question,16 courts might legitimately
leave breathing room for political processes to work out some issues
before making a dispositive judicial ruling.17 Perhaps temporary judicial
deference would have avoided the notorious Iowa removal episode.18
Toning down judicial rhetoric might be more palatable and effective.
The exiting corpus of judicial opinions, starting with Marbury v. Madison,
provides enough high-flown rhetoric to serve all our needs. Today’s judges
might be well advised to craft opinions in a manner that corresponds to
what they repeatedly say they are doing: merely measuring governmental
actions against constitutional standards that the people have imposed.
Eliminating high-minded language about “the duty of the courts” to protect
this or that interest might go a long way to defuse personal attacks upon
judges by electors who do not agree that this or that interest deserves
constitutional protection.19 It could refocus that ire into campaigns to
change the constitutional standards. After all, in Florida, “[a]ll political
power is inherent in the people”20 including the power to initiate
amendments to the Florida Constitution.21 Widely debated constitutional
amendment campaigns might supplant vendettas against virtually helpless
judges in unnoticed retention elections. Then, the people as a whole could
engage in determining what kind of constitution they want to govern them.
What then should Florida voters do in the 2012 merit retention
15. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840).
17. See, e.g., Dade County, 269 So. 2d 684.
18. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
19. Alexander Hamilton’s justification and defense of judicial independence in The Federalist
Papers cannot be improved upon. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Modern opinions
might merely drop a footnote to that and say no more about it.
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
21. Id. art. XI, § 3.
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election? That one is easy. They should vote to retain the current justices,
none of whom has demonstrated undue partisan bias or unfitness to
continue to serve.
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